Reviewsymposium: The theory and practice of multicultural theorizing by Chwaszcza, Christine
www.ssoar.info




Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Chwaszcza, C. (2008). Reviewsymposium: The theory and practice of multicultural theorizing. Ethnicities, 8(2),
261-265. https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968080080020103
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-230700
261
The theory and practice of multicultural
theorizing
CHRISTINE CHWASZCZA
European University Institute, Italy
Multicultural Odysseys reports a success story – the successful promotion
of the doctrine of liberal multiculturalism in the academic networks and
legal-bureaucratic circles of international organizations (p. 247f.). As Will
Kymlicka concedes with a degree of academic honesty often lacking today,
in international practice the doctrine has been less successful, if not a failure
(p. 248f.). The foreword promises to investigate the causes responsible for
the gap between theory and practice. According to Kymlicka, those causes
are to be found primarily in practice and on the level of implementation. I
disagree.
Focusing on Chapter 7 – ‘The Global Challenge’ – I would like to high-
light two purely theoretical problems in the attempt to export the doctrine
of liberal multiculturalism as a model of conflict resolution from Canada
to ‘postcolonial’ states. Kymlicka’s diagnosis, that the main obstacles to
success have been political resistance to reform and inappropriate pre-
conditions, sets up a scapegoat that distracts attention from theoretical and
methodological limits of the doctrine itself that would have prohibited any
attempt to export it to begin with. The first criticism concerns the theoreti-
cal structure behind the ideal of liberal multiculturalism, the second
Kymlicka’s image of the structure of international law and the problem
that he calls ‘sequencing’ (p. 254), i.e. the relation between individual
human rights and cultural group rights. On the basis of the two criticisms,
my conclusion addresses Kymlicka’s question as to whether normative
approaches towards conflict resolution in international law and inter-
national politics should adopt the strategy of articulating ‘general’ or
rather ‘targeted’ norms.
Like most liberal theories of justice – especially those inspired by Rawls’s
Theory of Justice (1971) – the doctrine of liberal multiculturalism is a theory
of just institutions. Despite his disagreement concerning the normative
significance of group-affiliations, Kymlicka endorses Rawls’s general
approach, which develops the ideal of a well-ordered institutional democ-
racy. The complex social practices that constitute the institutional frame-
work of the normative approach are an integral part of the concept of
justice that it develops. It should be evident from the very beginning that
normative requirements and ideals cannot be simply transferred to
whatever conditions and conflicts prevail in practice, but must be adjusted
to the empirical-practical conditions they are supposed to address.
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Normative theorizing therefore can never be an exercise of pure norma-
tive arguments detached from the structure and conflicts that characterize
empirical practice and the conditions of its normative reform or improve-
ment. That makes normative theorizing inevitably ‘contextual’, at least if it
is supposed to be of any practical relevance at all. As a consequence, one
cannot simply ‘apply’ a normative theoretical idea to different empirical
contexts, but has to develop different approaches in order to be able to
address the specific practical conflicts and the particular sociopolitical
environment that are one’s concern.
Notwithstanding a common tendency to indulge in ‘ideal’ theory and to
recast the analysis of sociopolitical practice exclusively as a task of ‘justify-
ing’ normative goals and moral ideals, normative theorizing cannot avoid
facing and analyzing the specific sociopolitical and institutional reality that
is addressed. It therefore should not come as a surprise that normative
theories can neither simply be applied to different sociopolitical realities
nor exported from one problem area to another.
Since the structural differences between the type of conflict that
Kymlicka hopes to address and the cultural conflicts in ‘postcolonial’
countries are partly acknowledged by Kymlicka, and elaborated by Andreas
Wimmer, I will not repeat the need to recognize those differences. But I
would like to stress that the failure to export liberal multiculturalism
reflects not a problem of ‘empirical preconditions,’ but bad methodology
and a mistaken image of the structure of normative theory.
The first criticism can be deepened. Personally, I have to confess that it
has always escaped me why membership in a particular culture ought to be
accepted as having the deep normative significance that Kymlicka and other
multiculturalists assign to it. To be sure, it cannot be doubted that human
beings cannot flourish outside some cultural environment. But the norma-
tive significance of being a member of a particular and specific culture or
nation that is different from others (or more precisely different from the
majority culture) is far from clear to me – especially if all cultures ought to
be considered to be equally inherently valuable for their members.
My suspicion has always been that the driving force behind liberal multi-
culturalism is an egalitarian conception of (social) justice, and that multi-
culturalist politics are favored as a means – or path – to promote more social
equality. The hidden rationale behind the enterprise obviously must be the
conviction that social inequality runs parallel to group-membership and is
caused by an unequal ‘distribution of sociopolitical advantages’ among
groups. Multicultural Odysseys confirms that suspicion.
Regardless of the plausibility of the hidden rationale, the difficulties of
identifying ‘minority cultures’ in conflicts that do not exhibit the ‘majority-
suppresses-minority-pattern’, and the problems that arise when the current
cultural (national) minority has itself been suppressive or acted unjustly in
the (postcolonial) past, illustrate not only conceptual difficulties, but a
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normative lacuna of liberal multiculturalism. Is it really justified or even
obligatory to respect the normative significance of cultural affiliations if it
nourishes conflict? Ought liberals to respect and protect ‘minority cultures’
if they are suppressive? And if the answer to the previous questions is ‘no’,
that is to say, if the crucial concerns of justice are about peace, social justice
and standards of egalitarian citizenship, what is then the normative signifi-
cance of group affiliations and why should liberal multiculturalism be inter-
nationally promoted? Sadly, those questions remain unaddressed in
Multicultural Odysseys.
The only place where Kymlicka comes close to addressing the limits
of the doctrine of liberal multiculturalism occurs in his discussion of
‘sequencing’. Here, Kymlicka considers the practical need to increase respect
for individual human rights before implementing liberal multiculturalism in
order to establish the sociopolitical preconditions that are necessary for
multiculturalist politics to work. Where group-membership can become a
matter ‘of life and death’, as Kymlicka observes, a step-by-step-approach
starting from the protection of individual rights, moving towards differen-
tial treatment of cultural groups, might be advisable.
As a liberal, one might ask whether there really is a problem of sequenc-
ing. At least within the liberal paradigm it seems obvious that the protec-
tion of individual rights to life and subsistence ought to be given priority
above differential treatment – not temporal, but normative priority – if the
two conflict in such dramatic ways. The reason is not only that the protec-
tion of individual life and liberty weighs heavier than the value of cultural
affiliations, but also that the protection of individuals’ human rights over-
rides concerns of inter-group justice.
Now, Kymlicka seems to think that the two kinds of normative concerns
have an equal status, at least in the framework of contemporary inter-
national law. Such a view is suggested by his claim that the renaissance of
the purpose of minority protection in the period after 1989 resembles or
revives legal concerns of international law that predated the Second World
War. That claim, I think, reflects a serious misunderstanding of the norma-
tive context that has been established by the development of humanitarian
law and the international human rights regimes in the second half of the
20th century. It decontextualizes the minority-rights concern in inter-
national law and international relations. Even if contemporary documents
use a similar terminology to earlier ones, the meaning and the intention
behind those documents must be interpreted against the legal, normative
and institutional context that has developed in the post-Second World War
period.
To the extent that international law has come to be conceived of as a
(modest) constraint for the legitimacy of domestic legal and political orders,
this ‘new’ form of interventionism cannot be detached from the overall
structure and purposes of post-war international law. Martha Finnemore
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(cf. Finnemore, 2003), among others, has highlighted the structural differ-
ences between pre-Second World War minority protection and interven-
tionism on the one hand, and contemporary practice on the other. Whereas
the former was to a significant extent Euro-chauvinistic, partisan Christian,
and conducted for national interest, the ‘new interventionism’ is driven by
human rights concerns about the victims and an ideal of collective security
that opposes the promotion of ‘national’ interest – or other forms of group
interests – but receives its normative justification from the legal (and moral)
principles of international human rights law.
Historically and systematically, the recent initiatives for minority rights
in international law are better understood as a development of human
rights concerns, whereby the focus on group rights expresses not so much a
commitment to normative support of cultural groups per se, but a response
to the particular structure of the kinds of conflicts that are addressed. In
other words, it more likely reflects a pragmatic rather than a normative
attitude.
That leaves us with the question of how to proceed, be it within or
beyond liberal multiculturalism. Kymlicka’s question of whether inter-
national norms in support of domestic justice should be general or targeted
remains untouched.
Although I have myself argued for ‘new interventionism’ (cf. Chwaszcza,
2007), I share a general skepticism towards attempts to develop general
normative solutions for cultural and sociopolitical conflicts in postcolonial
states. The empirical evidence we have from peace-keeping, peace-
enforcement, post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian intervention so
far do not support the search for general theories and grand design. Even
worse, recent studies by Roland Paris or Michael Ignatieff, and others,
indicate that liberal ideals of justice have proven unapt as a method for
conflict resolution in divided societies (cf. Paris, 2004; Ignatieff, 2003).
Given the fact that internal (violent or pre-violent) conflicts almost
always result from a syndrome of causes and are maintained for a multiplic-
ity of reasons, a theoretically modest case-oriented approach seems more
reasonable. It therefore seems advisable to postpone the search for ‘norms’
– be they general or targeted – and to rely instead on normatively informed
judgments for case to case. Our normative ideals provide no practically
informative guidance, as long as we do not understand the empirical-
practical sides of particular cultural and sociopolitical conflicts.
The problem is far from new or unique. Those, for example, who still
believe that there exists such a thing as ‘development economics’ and not
just neo-classical economics, have basically given up the idea of developing
a general theory, because the causes and situational factors that hinder
development are so heterogeneous that it does not make sense to look for
a general theory or for general recipes.
The practical failure of the doctrine of liberal multiculturalism in this
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sense is not exceptional. But given the rise of intra-state cases of violent
conflicts in recent decades, now is neither the time for academic network-
ing, nor for the application of ideal theory, but for interdisciplinary co-
operation and the courage to reassess traditional premises of political
liberalism. By trying to reassess the practical success of liberal multi-
culturalism, Multicultural Odysseys is making a step in such a direction.
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Kymlicka’s odyssey – lured by norms into the
rocks of politics
GWENDOLYN SASSE
University of Oxford, UK
Will Kymlicka has written another major study of multiculturalism that will
keep the academic community occupied for years to come and attract the
attention of policy makers. The title of his new book – Multicultural
Odysseys – evokes the image of long and nightmarish journeys, though
there is no apparent Odysseus-type protagonist in the story he tells. The
book is written in the style of an extended essay and places Kymlicka’s
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